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Did the French Canadians Cause 
the Conscription Crisis of 1917?
D E S M O N D  M O R T O N
E ditor’s Note: The text of this article is derived from a conference paper 
given by Desmond Morton, Professor of History Emeritus of M cGill at 
the St-Jean-Quebec Company History symposium at the Universite de 
Montreal October 31, 2014.
A  f e w  d a y s  a f t e r  the Great War broke out in 1914, Canada’s acting High Commissioner in London, George Perley, MP 
for the Quebec constituency of Argenteuil-Les Deux Montagnes 
and temporary replacement for the late Lord Strathcona, received 
a polite suggestion from the British colonial secretary: “Why not 
raise a Royal Montcalm Regiment in Canada? It might associate the 
name of Montcalm and the Province of Quebec specifically with an 
Empire War?” Perley dutifully transmitted the message to his prime 
minister, Sir Robert Borden but adding no endorsement for the idea: 
“personally doubt wisdom of doing anything to accentuate different 
Races as all are Canadians.” Perley was as blissfully unaware as the 
Prime Minister about how profoundly the Great War would tear 
Canada’s founding nations apart and doom his own party to Liberal 
dominance for the rest of the Twentieth Century. While Montcalm 
was better remembered in Quebec as a loser rather than a proud link 
to an embattled France, Perley and Borden would have been wise to 
consider how best to engage Quebecois in a war proclaimed by Great 
Britain without any consultation with Ottawa or any other dominion 
or colony in a world-wide Empire.
Of course, when he sent on the message, Perley seemed to be 
right. The news of war inspired a popular excitement that was
© Canadian Military History 24, no. 1 (Winter/Spring 2015): 89-99
1
: Did the French Canadians Cause the Conscription Crisis of 1917?
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015
reported to be even greater in Montreal and Quebec than in the rain- 
drenched cities of the Canadian West. French-language newspapers 
were almost as enthusiastic as the Anglophone press in supporting 
the war. Henri Bourassa’s Le Devoir dutifully echoed its proprietor’s 
opposition to fighting in a British war, but no one could be astonished 
at a familiar Bourassa opinion. Bourassa himself narrowly escaped 
internment by the Germans. He was visiting Alsace to see how the 
French language was surviving German occupation of the former 
French province, and he slipped across the frontier minutes before 
it closed. In Ottawa, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, leader of the Opposition 
and French Canada’s leading federal politician declared a truce in 
partisan conflict and insisted that Canada must do all in her power 
to support the British cause.
A few months earlier, a sad and significant development had 
occurred within Quebec’s share of Canada’s volunteer militia. The 
86th Regiment in Trois-Rivieres was quietly disbanded. Opposition 
politicians had an obvious explanation. The regiment had been 
commanded by a former mayor who had become Minister of 
Highways in Quebec’s Liberal government. Colonel Sam Hughes, a 
Borden loyalist as well as an outspoken Orangeman, had been chosen 
as the Conservative Minister of Militia. Hughes was a blind believer 
in his own genius. He had answered the demands from Canadian 
militarists, including his elder brother, James L. Hughes, for universal 
cadet training for Canadian schoolboys and girls by insisting the 
militia summer camps were the ideal environment for teaching young 
Canadians patriotism and respect for their betters.
The truth about the 86th Regiment was perhaps more alarming 
than the claims of political meddling. The regiment vanished from the 
Militia List because its junior officers had failed to qualify for their 
rank by attending courses at the infantry school at St-Jean or even the 
artillery school at the Citadelle in Quebec City. When a provisional 
school was established at the new armouries in Trois-Rivieres, hardly 
any of the 86th’s unqualified officers showed up, though the timetable 
would have allowed most of them to remain at their respective day 
jobs. That failure was the last straw for the Militia’s senior officers and, 
on the eve of war, the regiment was disbanded.
Sam Hughes approved the decision but played no active part 
beyond approving the provisional school in a final attempt to save 
the unit. When war came on August, his fear that the British would, 
in his vernacular, “burke it,” led him to order the Union Jack to
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be hauled down from the roof of Militia Headquarters, only to be 
restored when the war was declared. His staff had prepared a detailed 
mobilization plan that selected specific militia regiments across 
Canada to recruit to full strength and assemble at Petawawa, the 
country’s biggest training camp. Hughes had a better idea. He had 
turned down a plan to open a similar camp outside Quebec City 
when local landowners became too greedy to surrender their land 
at a nominal price. With a war in Europe, Quebec City would be 
the idea place to embark a Canadian contingent and the proposed 
camp at Valcartier was revived. Colonel William Price of Quebec’s 
most powerful business family, was charged with preparing the camp 
and contractors building the Connaught rifle range outside Ottawa 
packed up their tools and travelled to the new camp to provide it 
with one of the biggest rifle ranges in the world.
Instead of arriving with regiments hurriedly recruited and 
expanded in their home towns, telegrams summoned colonels and 
whatever officers and men they could assemble to come to Valcartier 
where Sam Hughes would organize them into a First Canadian 
Contingent big enough to form a British-style infantry division. In 
the end, some 31,000 men arrived from the rest of Canada, far more 
than an infantry division in numbers and even more outsized in the 
ratio of officers to other ranks. Instead of twelve infantry battalions, 
Hughes would organize nineteen. The bulk of the men— close to
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seventy percent— were British-born, many of them recent immigrants 
who had learned that Canada, with its harsh climate and its “No 
English Need Apply” signs, was not an easy place to make a fortune. 
Of the remaining 30 percent, there is some evidence that Canadian- 
born Francophones were disproportionally more numerous than 
their English-speaking counterparts. Organizationally, that made no 
impact on Hughes.
Since Confederation, every significant operation by the volunteer 
militia had been structured to ensure significant French-Canadian 
representation. In the Red River Expedition of 1870, the two 
Canadian battalions had each represented a major province, Ontario 
and Quebec. In 1885, two French- speaking battalions, one each from 
Montreal and Quebec, had gone west. Even in the South African War, 
Major Oscar Pelletier and a francophone company raised in Montreal 
had been part of Colonel Otter’s 2nd “Special Service” Battalion. 
Later, one of three artillery batteries was essentially francophone 
and Lt. Col. Frangois-Louis Lessard had commanded one of two 
regiments of Canadian Mounted Rifles.
Periodically, some of the British generals who commanded the 
Canadian Militia between 1874 and 1904, raised the issue of language, 
usually to the annoyance and resentment of their stubbornly unilingual 
militia staff officers. A British Army that raised its soldiers in India 
and Africa had no room for unilingualism in its traditions but generals 
who dared to raise the issue, such as Major Generals Ivor Hutton and 
E.T.H. Hutton, saw their Canadian careers foreshortened.
The tradition of Quebec francophone involvement meant nothing 
to Sam Hughes. If he wished the Canadians to be commanded by one 
of their own, Colonel Lessard was an obvious choice though it was 
inconceivable that Hughes would choose a French Canadian Roman 
Catholic for a job he badly wanted for himself. Instead, Hughes 
promoted himself to major-general and made it clear to the British 
that he was the ideal man to command the Canadians when they 
formed a division. The British remembered him in South Africa, 
where he wrote letters to the Cape Town newspapers expressing his 
contempt for his British superiors; they sent him home to Canada in 
1900. In September 1914, the War Office appointed a British officer, 
Major-General Edmund Alderson, who had commanded Canadians 
in the Boer War and would command them in France until his 
campaign to replace the seriously defective Ross rifle gave its chief 
advocate, Sam Hughes, an obvious excuse to get rid of him
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When Canada’s First Contingent embarked for England in early 
October, 1914, a single company in the 14th Battalion from Montreal 
was composed of Francophones. A 12th Battalion was formed from 
the tiny contingents from rural Quebec and Atlantic Canada militia 
units. When a Second Contingent was launched in October, it took 
a delegation of Montreal businessmen, led by Arthur Mignault, a 
wealthy patent medicine manufacturer, and a campaign by La Presse, 
then Canada’s largest daily newspaper, to persuade Hughes that the 
new contingent could include a 22e bataillon Canadien-frangais. 
While Mignault and Lorenzo Prince, managing editor of La Presse, 
suggested a number of possible commanding officers for the battalion, 
Hughes imposed his own choice, an elderly Colonel Frederic Mondelet 
Gaudet, whom the Minister himself had fired as the director of the 
Dominion Arsenal for alleged incompetence.
Whatever his limitations, Colonel Gaudet had the good judgement 
to find a successor in Colonel Thomas Tremblay, another, much 
younger, product of the resolutely anglophone r m c  at Kingston and a 
man whose raw courage and commitment to discipline helped make 
the 22e bataillon Canadien-frangais sufficiently outstanding to earn a 
postwar place in Canada’s tiny permanent force. When Quebec M P ’s 
discovered after the war that five of twenty-five Canadian soldiers 
executed by firing squad bore French names, they planned an angry
5
: Did the French Canadians Cause the Conscription Crisis of 1917?
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015
protest. When they discovered that Colonel Tremblay had approved 
most of the executions to reinforce the discipline and self-respect of his 
battalion, they dropped their plans, Tremblay had restored the military 
prestige Colonel de Salaberry had left as a heritage of French Canada.
When he cancelled the mobilization plan Militia staff officers had 
prepared for a Great War in Europe, Sam Hughes gave himself the 
power to determine how Canadians would be recruited and who would 
lead them in battle. Hughes’s concept of organizing Canadians for 
the war in France was to select a suitable commanding officer for an 
infantry battalion or artillery battery and let the chosen officer recruit 
the thousand officers and soldiers for a battalion or a couple of hundred 
for a battery. They would also need fund-raising resources to finance 
the advertising for the recruiting effort and to meet the expenses of 
recruiting officers as they searched for volunteers in rural districts and 
remote communities. The 22e battalion, for example, was recruited 
mainly in Montreal but significant contributions came from Quebec, 
Sherbrooke and Hull as the present Gatineau was called at the time.
Recruiting in Quebec posed some inherent structural difficulties. 
The province had not experienced the brief but intense militarism 
shared by Ontario and other predominantly Anglophone provinces 
which had often taken the form of cadet corps in public and private 
schools. Quebec’s population was, on the whole, more agricultural 
than that of Ontario and men who transferred their labour from 
the farm to the army dropped farm productivity dramatically. Rural 
districts of western Ontario also proved to be reluctant recruiting 
territory. Urban populations, by contrast, included the poverty- 
stricken elements created by the economic depression that coincided 
with the last years of the Laurier government and continued in the 
Borden years. Such men might be coerced into enlisting by the 
promise of three meals a day and an army overcoat but they were 
not necessarily valued member of the c e f . Montreal was also a centre 
for munition production. Workers, male and female, were recruited 
by reminding them that making munitions was as vital to victory as 
soldiering. It was both dangerous and better-paid.
War in 1914 tended to encourage English-speaking Canadians to 
identify with their British ancestors and to respond enthusiastically 
to the demands of Imperial patriotism. For obvious reasons, this 
mood found little or no echo among francophone Quebeckers. On 
the contrary, the evidence that Canada had been engaged in a vast 
and difficult war without consultation or consent persuaded many
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Quebecois that they had no personal commitment to the war. While 
some, notably Bourassa’s lieutenant, Olivar Asselin, felt a passionate 
commitment to fight or die for France, more Quebeckers were urged 
by the clergy to let France be punished for its controversial secular 
reforms in the early years of the twentieth century. A  flow of Catholic 
clergy across the Atlantic to Quebec filled many of the province’s 
pulpits to suggest that France’s war and the consequent costs were 
part of divine retribution for seizing control of public education.
The Borden government struggled to contain both pro-imperial 
zeal and reluctance by insisting that service in the Canadian 
Contingent would be entirely voluntary. Several hundred would- 
be soldiers were sent home from Valcartier in 1914 at the behest 
of wives who had not granted their husbands permission to enlist 
or of mothers who complained that their sons were under-age for 
military service. Both the Prime Minister and Colonel Sam Hughes 
repeated their commitment to the voluntary principle in speeches 
across Canada. Hughes also encouraged recruiting with the repeated 
insistence that volunteers would enter battle serving beside neighbours 
and old friends, in battalions that, for the most part, were locally 
recruited. Some c e f  units welcomed recruits from Scandinavian and 
other ethnic communities that had developed in the period of mass 
European immigration during the more prosperous of the Laurier 
years. A  few recruited actively in Aboriginal communities.
Voluntarism was not without its risks. Major-General Willoughby 
Gwatkin, the British officer commanding the Canadian Militia in 
1914 warned the government that it could probably not maintain 
more than two infantry divisions in the field if all recruits had to be 
volunteers. It was a warning that Sam Hughes ridiculed as typical 
of the timidity and incompetence of British army officers. Instead, 
Hughes insisted, Canada could easily raise twenty-four divisions of 
volunteers and Sir Robert Borden announced to Canadians in his 
1916 New Year’s Day message that Canada’s enlistment target had 
been raised to half a million men.
French Canada was part of the target for this massive enrolment. 
With substantial financial help from Dr. Arthur Mignault and a 
promotional campaign in the pages of La Presse, the ranks of the 
22nd Battalion had been filled with the aid of drafts from Western 
Canada’s francophone communities and from Acadians who enlisted 
at Amherst, NS— the unit’s last Canadian stop before heading to 
England with the Second Contingent. Hughes promptly authorized
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a 4ie bataillon to be recruited in Quebec’s Military District No. 5, 
covering the northern end of the province. The command was given 
to a former second-in-command of the 22nd Battalion, and it was 
not a success. The bulk of recruiting occurred in the harsh winter of 
1916 and in Montreal’s shelters for homeless men. Montreal had no 
appropriate barracks and existing militia regiments, most of them 
anglophone, proved reluctant to share their armouries with the men 
of the 41st. The unit’s second-in-command was dismissed when he 
used regimental funds to buy himself an automobile. Sent to England 
to organize a mess for the battalion’s officers, Lieutenant Coderre, the 
assistant adjutant of the 41st, was arrested for murdering a sergeant 
from a neighbouring unit who had come to the premises believing 
them to be a brothel. Arrested by British police, Coderre would 
probably have been hanged for his offence without the snowstorm of 
letters from prominent citizens of Sherbrooke protesting that “le fou 
Coderre” suffered from mental, not criminal, disabilities.
The 41st became a major source of replacements for the severe 
losses the 22nd Battalion suffered at Courcelette and Regina Trench 
during the Somme offensive of 1916, and Colonel Tremblay was forced 
to ignore his haemorrhoids and rejoin his regiment to restore the 
stern discipline a first-class unit required to maintain its reputation.
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In all, eight of the 262 infantry battalions raised for overseas 
service in the Great War addressed themselves to enlisting 
francophone recruits and letting them serve in their own language. 
While the quality of their recruits allowed French Canada’s 22nd 
battalion to maintain its heroic and sacrificial record to the end of the 
war, some of the recruited battalions resembled the 41st Battalion in 
their quality of leadership and efficiency and some were possibly worse. 
The 206th Battalion, raised by Lieutenant Colonel Tancrede Pagneulo, 
was broken up in Canada after Pagnuelo himself directed his men to 
desert. He, himself, was arrested, charged for stealing his soldier’s pay 
cheques and sentenced to six month in prison. Some battalions were 
very much better managed, trained and prepared for service.
As usual, everything depended on the officers and on the 
commanding officer who selected them and managed the unit’s fiscal 
administration. As Jean-Pierre Gagnon records in his thorough and 
extensive chapters on the recruiting of men for the 22e battalion, 
younger officers who had served in the francophone company of the 
14th Battalion were obvious choices to organize units back home in 
Quebec but how could they, in their young lives and brief service, 
have acquired the knowledge and experience to manage the training 
and administration of a regiment of raw recruits?
Olivar Asselin raised the i63re Battalion, “les poils aux pattes,” 
with the distinct mission of fighting for France. With a war veteran as 
Colonel, he accepted the lesser role of second-in-command. When he 
complained about sharing a barracks with a drunken and disorderly 
battalion, Sam Hughes promptly ordered the 163rd to defend the 
British island of Bermuda. When he accepted Black recruits, the 
venerable British commander-in-chief on the island was enraged and 
ordered that the 163rd never be allowed near the Front. Asselin went 
to war as a lieutenant in the 22nd, too poorly paid to support his wife 
and three children.
Whether well or badly commanded, units raised in Quebec faced 
difficulties familiar to anyone who has tried to recruit soldiers in war 
time. The medical certificates of fitness, issued by family physicians, 
frequently ignored obvious disabilities. Why should a doctor annoy 
current and future patients by denying a young man a chance to serve 
his country? Each battalion struggled to fill its ranks but when that 
task was complete and orders arrived for the embarkation to England, 
francophone units promptly experienced hundreds of desertions or 
absences without leave. A  major expense for each unit’s recruiting
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fund was the cost of prosecuting deserters in Quebec courts. Many of 
the deserters simply enlisted in another battalion to retain a soldier’s 
free meals and his $1.10 day’s pay. Others slipped back across the 
American border where some miscreants set up shop to sell advice on 
how to fool the military authorities. In the mood of Quebec by 1917, 
none of this seemed particularly reprehensible.
Yet Willoughby Gwatkin had been right. By the summer of 1916, 
Canada maintained four infantry divisions and a three-regiment 
cavalry brigade on the Western Front. Participation in the battles 
on the Somme cost 23,000 casualties; capturing Vimy Ridge took 
ten thousand dead, wounded and prisoners. By the summer of 1916, 
volunteers stopped appearing at recruiting depots across Canada and 
in Quebec. There were many reasons. The supply of adventure-seeking 
patriots had dried up. The brutal realities of Trench warfare crushed 
romantic illusions of glory. Fervent assertions of British identity faded 
into questions about the competence of the Empire’s generals in the 
face of recurrent failures and mounting casualties.
In the spring of 1917, Dominion prime ministers gathered in 
London to meet the latest British premier, the former Minister 
of Munitions and radical Liberal, David Lloyd George. Dominion 
politicians would finally learn how the war was really going.
Some news was good and already known. The United States 
had entered the war; the Canadians had taken Vimy Ridge. After 
years of failure and defeat, that was a very welcome victory. But the 
Americans had no modern army and would need two years to create 
one. Meanwhile, the winter offensive by the French Army had ended in 
mutinies and mass desertions. On the Eastern Front, Russian armies 
had reeled backward from German attacks and mass desertions and 
mutinies had spread through the Czar’s armies and navy.
At the front, Russian soldiers were starved of food and ammunition 
because the Russian railway system had crunched to a stop. Since 
Moscow was the only site for repair shops, every line into the city was 
jammed by broken down locomotives and railway cars. A  Canadian 
named Joe Boyle would solve the problem by ignoring landlords and 
levering the broken cars and engines off the rails and into adjacent 
fields. That came later. In the spring of 1917, we were losing a terrible 
war. Was this a moment for Sir Robert Borden to report that Canada 
would have to cut its contribution to the war in half? His answer was 
the Military Service Act of 1917 with its escape-clauses for farmers 
and their sons and for conscientious objectors, to be forgotten in 1918
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when English Canada had re-elected him and a Union government of 
Conservatives and non-Quebec Liberals.
Did Quebec cause the conscription crisis of 1917? Dare we blame 
Sir Sam Hughes? What could he or his government have done to 
persuade a Quebec that had reluctantly gone to war in 1914 to give 
its heart and soul to share a commitment when the prewar policies 
of the government had ignored French Canada? What would it take 
to make Quebec feel part of the Dominion its leaders had created in 
1867 and sustained at each ensuing crisis?
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